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Bellare et al note that if the sequence number for SSH-2 MACs repeats itself without an intervening rekey, all sorts of attacks become possible. If PuTTY were particularly paranoid, it could force a re-key before this happens, and even kill the connection if the sequence number did wrap around. More polite would probably be a note in the documentation that turning off traffic-based re-keying is a very bad idea and to accept the worse-than-it-could-be security of connections to servers that can't re-key.